June 23, 2000

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director

FROM: T. Dwyer, H. Waugh, and W. White, Pantex Site Representatives

SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending June 23, 2000

DNFSB Activity Summary: T. Dwyer, H. Waugh, and W. White were on site all week. M. Helfrich and Outside Expert R. Lewis were on site all week observing the ISMS Verification.

B61 Mod 10 Project: The B61 Mod 10 Project DOE Readiness Assessment (RA) concluded this week, reporting 2 pre-start and 1 post-start findings. The 1st pre-start finding is related to inadequate traceability of controls in the project AB documents [i.e., the associated JCO and hazard analysis]. In particular, M&H did not adequately address 3 of the Conditions of Approval levied by AAO in the SER that approved the JCO. The 2nd pre-start finding is a compilation of procedural changes that M&H must address, including a requirement that the M&H General Manager justify each use of flammable solvents in the presence of the nuclear explosive prior to final approval of the NEOP and NEEP. The post-start finding is related to programmatic control of lightning-related design features [i.e., Faraday cage penetrations]. [II.A]

<u>Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) Verification:</u> The Phase II ISMS Verification, scheduled to be conducted from June 19th through 27th, is in progress. Several potential issues have been identified and are currently being verified by the team. The team is attempting to compress the verification from the typical 2 weeks to the shorter period allotted.^[II.A]

Recommendation 98-2: On May 23rd, the Board sent a letter to DP-1 indicating that DOE should reassess its plans for weapons systems that involved implementing SS-21 in a 2-step process. This week, the Site Representatives have learned that DOE-AL (ONDP) has decided to continue the 2-step SS-21 program for the W78.^[II.A]

<u>Pit Issues:</u> When maintenance personnel arrived at the equipment room for the 12-99 facility this week, they discovered that the HVAC system was putting 110°F air into bay 4. Further investigation revealed that the in-line restrictor in the instrument air line was effectively plugged, and the sensor/transmitter in the bay was malfunctioning. The system is now repaired; more detailed monitoring is underway to verify normal operation. Meanwhile, today AAO signed out a letter directing M&H to formalize controls to prevent similar events in the future.^[II.A]

<u>W88 Program:</u> This month's M&H IWAP Status Report states that the W88 schedule must slip 24 additional weeks. At least 6 weeks of that slip is blamed on AAO insistence that NEOPs be in final form and PT training be complete before the contractor declares readiness for the DOE Readiness Assessment -- M&H is apparently viewing this as a <u>new requirement</u>. [II.A]

<u>Facility Representative Program:</u> AAO conducted Facility Representative oral examinations (final qualification) for 2 candidates on Tuesday. Both candidates passed, raising the total number of fully qualified Facility Representatives at Pantex to 8. The oral examination board conducted itself in a professional manner, and the conclusions reached in both cases, including specified remedial training requirements, captured the Site Representatives' concerns. These were the 1st oral examinations conducted under Mr. D. Glenn's tenure. [I.B.]

<u>AL-R8 Sealed Insert (SI) Repackaging Line:</u> M&H has cleaned the etching acid from all ready inventory AL-R8 SIs. Repackaging throughput was higher this week -- 35 pits. [II.A]